The Influence of Sociology on American Jurisprudence from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Critical Legal Studies by Trevino, A. Javier
THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIOLOGY ON AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE: FROM OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES TO
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
A. Javier Trevino
Marquette University
Mid-American Review ofSociology, 1994, Vol XVIII, No. I & 2: 23-46
This paper analyzes the distinctive influence that sociology has had on legal
scholarship during the past century. II examines some of Ihe more
significant contributions that sociology has made to four of the major
jurisprudential "movements" of the twentieth-century: Holmesian legal
science, soci%gical jurisprudence. legal Realism. and Critical Legal
Studies. In essence, this paper shows how sociology has: (1) contributed to
the language of the law some of its more important concepts, (2) given
jurisprudence penetrating insight inlo the social dynamics of the law, (3)
revealed the close relationship which exists between law and the other social
institutions, (4) provided jurisprudence with a positivistic. structural
methodology by which to study the law. and (5) inspired a legal approach
thaI is perspectival and hermeneutical in orientation.
Introduction
Several scholars (Geis 1964; Hunt ]978; Hall, Wiecek, and Finkelman
1991 :456457; Horwitz ]992; Vago 1994) have noted the tremendous impact
that social science has made on American jurisprudence. My intention in this
paper is to engage in a more detailed. extended, and updated analysis than that
previously rendered by these scholars, of the distinctive influence that sociology
has had on legal scholarship during the last one hundred years or so. The
rationale fOf .undertakil)gsl~~h a~ analysis -is to clarify and accentuate the
contours of the ongoing discourse between theoretical sociology and
jurisprudential thought.
In this paper I will examine some of the contributions that sociology has
made to four inteJlectual legal traditions or "movements" of the twentieth
century: (I) Holmesian legal science, (2) sociological jurisprudence, (3) legal
Realism, and (4) Critical Legal Studies.2
Holmesian Legal Science
It may well be that Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. is indeed "the most
important and innuential legal thinker America has had" (Horwitz 1992: 109). It
is an acknowledged fact. however, that he did not develop an axiomatic social
theory. Nor did he ever rely wholly or even partially on any well-formulated
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I cannot refrain from writing a word of appreciation of the two books to
you. They are so civilized, so enlightened by side knowledge, often
indicated by a single key word, so skeptical yet so appreciative even of
illusion, so abundant in insight, and often so crowded with felicities, that it
makes me happy to think that they come from America and not from Europe.
They hit me where I live ... (Ross 1936:99).
Sometime in 1920 Holmes purchased a copy of Ross' Principles of
Sociology. Not long thereafter in a letter to Laski. Holmes wrote, ". wish
[Ross'] teaching in its substance were more taken to heart" (Howe 1953:272).
Finally, having heard that the works of Albion Small had made a great
impression on Roscoe Pound. Holmes took it upon himself to rCild Small's The
Meaning of Social Science at the end of 1919. The Justice felt inclined to
compare Small to the Yale sociologist Wimam Graham Sumner. It appears,
however, that Holmes, remained forever unimpressed with Small's work.
Whether he looked upon the aforementioned thinkers and their ideas in a
favorable or unfavorable light Holmes was, at least latenlly, affected by the
sociology of his time. Nevertheless, with or without the sociologists, the
.. _. ''' __ ......'••.• , ". -. "- ....~~_ -.IS. -.• • .~ _ ;'l. ._-.;•. , .•, _ .
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Holmes referred to the Gennan sociologist as "a dull maker of categories" (Howe
1953:653). Regarding Gustave Le Bon's Les opinions etles croyances (1911),
Holmes wrote that the book is "not the flash of lightning that [Le Bon] seems to
think it but with enough good sense to make me wish that all educated persons
might read it" (Howe 1953:377). The Justice was obviously well read in general
sociology.
In the area of the sociology of law, Holmes knew the works of Georges
Gurvitch and Eugen Ehrlich. Harold Laski described to Holmes Gurvitch's L'idee
du droit social (1932), as ..... monumental. Full of learning, pointed, suggestive,
it gives you a sense of legal philosophy changing to fit new needs which I found
really exhilarating" (Howe 1953: 1364). About Ehrlich, Holmes wrote: "I have
just finished reading ." Ehrlich, Die Juristische Logik -- which' might call an
elaborate proof of myoid thesis that the life of the law has not been logic; it has
been experience.... I thought his Grundelung der Soziologie des Rechts the best
book on legal subjects by any living continental jurist that I knew of' (Howe
1941:34).
Lester F. Ward, Edward A. Ross, and Albion Small were among the early
American sociologists the Justice had added to his reading list. Holmes was
familiar with the first's Outlines of Sociology (1898) and Dynamic Sociology
(1883). He wrote to a friend in 1906: "Having heard that Lester Ward -- author of
"Dynamic Sociology" and patriarch of the theme in this country --was about to
leave Washington, I called, simply to express my homage" (Novick 1989:285).
Holmes had also read Ross' Social Control and Foundations of Sociology. and
being extremely impressed by these two volumes, recommended them to
President Theodore Roosevelt. In a letter dated May 6, 1906 Holmes wrote to
Ross:
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sociological approach. Nevertheless, the ideas of certain sociological thinkers
very likely did infonn and impact upon Holmes' work.
Unlike most of his nineteenth-century contemporaries who considered the
law to be a logical and autonomous system of axioms frozen for all time,
Holmes saw the law as flexible and responsive to the changing needs of society.
Even though he wavered from it throughout his life, this sociogenic premise
guided Holmes' jurisprudence and made him a model for subsequent generations.
of legal scholars who favored a "realistic" approach to the law. As I will show
presently, there is strong evidence indicating that several sociologists did indeed
have a notable effect on Holmes' thinking and that Holmes was well versed in
the sociological imagination.
Holmes and the Sociologists
A voracious reader all his life, Justice Holmes was also very critical of
much of what he read. But, regardless of whether he felt positively or negatively
about sociological writers and their conceptions, it is clear that Holmes was
influenced by them.
While a student at Harvard Law School between 1864 and 1866, the young
Holmes augmented his assigned readings on the law with the works of Auguste
Comle, John Stuart Mill, and Herbert Spencer. Allhough ambivalent about
Spencer's ideas, Holmes never ceased making reference to him. Just prior to its
publication, Holmes reviewed favorably Spencer's The Study of Sociology
remarking that "[e]very page of Mr. Spencer's writing is illuminated by those
side lights which only a great scholar in books, or nature, or both, can throw
upon the subject with which he is dealing" (1873 a:587).
The Justice also read Spencer's Principles of Sociology, calling its writer
"dull." Holmes stated: "[Spencer] writes an ugly uncharming style, his ideals are
those of a lower middle class British Philistine. And yet after all abatements I
doubt if any writer of English except Darwin has done so much to affect our
whole way of thinking about the universe" (Howe 1941:58). Holmes also
invoked the social theorists' name and one of his most important works when, in
.'woting hisdissentto'the"1905·U.S. Supreme·C'oiiri"caseL.'OChner' v. New York, .
he declared his now famous aphorism that the "Fourteenth Amendment does not <
enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." Clearly, Spencer's sociology l
evinced some direct influence on Holmes' J'uristic thinking. t;-I,
Apparently unacquainted with the classic works of Emile Durkheim and I
Max Weber, Holmes, however, recognized the sociological writings of sch~lars ~~
as diverse as Georges Sorel, William F. Ogburn and Alexander Goldenwelser, :'.
Thorstein Veblen, and Gabrel Tarde. About the last, Holmes, went so far as to ,ift·
say that "Tarde is so fertile that I feel much indebted to him" (Howe 1941 :78). ~~;:".:.'
Other sociologists with whom Holmes was familiar included Franklin H. •
Giddings, Georg Simmel, and Gustave Le Bon. Holmes stated that he had gouen
"lillie nourishment" from Gidding's The Principles of Sociology (1896) (Howe ~,
1953:660). After perusing Simmel's Melanges de philosophie relativiste (1912), It
.iJ.
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fundamental premise of Holmesl jurisprudence -- that law IIcorrespond with the
actual feelings and demands of the communityfl -- affords his work a distinctly
sociological caste. He began to articulate this "socio-Iegal ll jurisprudence in his
masterpiece. The Common Law.
The Common Law
Touster maintains that Holmesl goal in The Common Law was lito do from
the materials of the common law what Sir Henry Maine in his Ancient Law had
done (rom lite materials of Roman law twenty years before" (1982:684). That is
to say, Holmes traced the evolution of the common law by employing Mainels
method of historical analysis. But by no means was Maine the sole innuence.
Holmes also internalized the ideas on evolution and competition proposed by
Charles Darwin and Herben Spencer. To be sure, Holmes utilized Spencer's
concept of Itintegration't in explaining the evolution of ton law (See Holmes
1899:450-451; Elliot 1984:126-129). Moreover, the serious reader of The
Common Law is sure to recognize that Holmes "uses common-law history in
roughly the same way that Darwin used observations of animals and plants in
nature, as raw material to be searched for evidence of patterns of gradual,
evolution8l}' transformations" (Elliot,1984: 120).
Generally accepted as commonplace today, Holmes' explanation of how the
law emerges and unfolds was revolutionary, even heretical, when he first
proposed it in the late nineteenth-century. According to him. society detcnnines
which legal roles are to survive and how they will be used. Holmes sees a close
association between law and society when he writes that UThe law embodies the
story of a nation's development" (1963:5).
In contradiction to the fonnalist/conceptualist legal doctrine of the time.
which held that the law was composed of perennial truths which, through logical
and deductive reasoning, would yield certain obdurate rules, Holmes emphatically
assened that the law consists of rules which are fairly fluid and which are
contingent upon the needs and demands of the social environment. Holmes'
assenion sharply attacked Harvard Law School Dean Christopher Columbus
•.... Langdell'selaim'of being able to logically derive ultimate scientific principles-
by the case method which Langdell introduced at Harvard in 1870. In what is
arguably the most famous passage in The Common Law, Holmes stales:
The life of the law has not been logic: il has been experience. The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political Iheories.
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious. even the prejudices
which judges share with their fellow-men. have had a good deal more to do
than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be
governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's development through
many centuries, and it cannol be dealt with as if it contained only the
axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. In order to know what il
is, we must know what it has been, and what it tends 10 become. We must
alternately consult history and existing theories of legislation. But Ihe
The Innuence of Sociology
most difficult labor will be to understand the combination of the IW • I
new products al every stage (1963:5). 0 In a
Social Conflict and the Law
From the foregoing passage of his famous treatise. it is obvious that
~olmes saw the law as eman~ti~~ from one primary source: the Uactual feelings
and demands or the commuDlty. Holmes, however. did not believe that the law
resufled from a general agreement of communal wishes. Indeed for him it was
nol consen~us, but social connict that detennined which public·policies would
be enacted mto law and which ones would fall by the wayside.3 Consequently
he regarded !h~,true source of law as "the will of the de facto supreme power or
the comm.u~lIy (Holmes 1873:583). In other words, Holmes maintained that in
the ~arwmlan strugg~e for social existence, the public policy which becomes
law IS t~e one that sausfi~ the needs. desires. interests, beliefs, and preferences
of that Interest group which has the power to impose its will - by force if need
be -- on .all t~e other ~roups in society. Holmes describes this process. in strict
Spence!lan (I.e. t .soclal Darwinist) terms as. tIthe struggle for life among
competmg [legal] Ideas, and of the ultimate victory and survival of the strongest"
(1899:449). Th~, for Holmes. the IIlaw embodies beliefs that have triumphed in
the battle of Ideas and then have translated themselves into action"
(J 953:294-295).
Holmes' theory of soci.al connict and the law -- a theory which emphasizes
force and self-preference - IS made abundantly clear in the following stalements:
B~t in the last resort a man rightly prefers his own interest to that of his
neighbors. ~nd this is as true in legislation as in any other form of
corpora!e a~tlOn. All that. can be expected from modem improvements is
!hat leglslahon ~hould ~..y and quickly, yel not too quickly, modify itself
In accordance With the will of the de facto supreme power in the community.
a~d th.a! the sprea~ ~f an educated sympathy should reduce the sacrifice of
mmontles to a mlnlm~m. BU~ whatever .body may possess the supreme
po~er for. the moment IS certain to have Interests inconsistent with others
which have compeled unsuccessfully: The'more powerful interests must be
more or less renecled in legislation; which, like every other device of man
?r beast. m~st tend in the long run to aid the survival of the fittest. ... BUI it
IS no suffiCient condemnation of legislalion that it favors one class al the
expense o.r ~not~er; for much .or all legislation does that. ... If the welfare
of the maJonty 1.5 par~mount. tl can only be on the ground that the majority
have the power In t~elr ha.n~s. The. fact is that legislation in this country, as
well as el~ewhere. 1$ empmcal. .. IS necessarily made a means by which a
body, havmg the power, put burdens which are disagreeable to them on ahe
shoulders of somebody else (Holmes 1873b:S83-584).
In "The Path.of the Law" (1897), Holmes regards as "fallacies" two
fundamental and Interrelated assumptions of late nineteenth-century legal
26 {:
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orthodoxy: (1) that the law is inseparably linked with, and relies upon a system
of moral standards, and (2) that the law is composed of a complete and inclusive
set of fixed premises from which judicial opinions can be logically and
deductively derived, and cases settled once and for all. A brief examination of this
second assumption provides another example of Holmes' theory of social
contlicL
Holmes' principal objective was to falsify the formalist notion that the
"force at work in the development in the law is logic," and that. as a
consequence, legal rules "can be worked out like mathematics from some geneml
axioms of conduct" (Holmes 1897:465). As previously demonstrated. he had
poignantly stated a few years earlier in The Common Law that. [t]he life of the
law has not been logic: it has been experience" (emphasis added).
Lawyers and judges are trained to reason according to the method of
syllogistic logic; it is the method "in which they are most at home." notes
Holmes (1897:465). In addition. judges believe that. by applying logical
reasoning to a case, they can arrive at a definitive judicial decision. Holmes' saw
the judicial process in a more pragmatic and sociological manner. Thus, Holmes
would have us believe that cases are decided on "battle grounds where the means
do not exist for detenninations that shall be good for all time, and where the
[judicial] decision can do no more than embody the preference of a given body in
a given time and place" (Holmes 1897:466). In other words, the opinion that a
judge renders in a case is not detennined by logical inference alone, but by the
fluctuating wishes and feelings of the majority social group. Furthennore,
because the judge must consider the competing social ends and temporal desires,
court decisions are not certain and absolute; they are, in fact, transitory and
historically contingenL
In Holmes' view, judicial decisionmaking is not a logico-deductive exercise
with judges finding and applying predetennined legal postulates. Rather, cases
are decided according to the policy choice that the judge makes as he or she
weighs and measures the "conflict between two social desires ... which cannot
both have their way. The social question is which desire is stronger at the point
ofconflict" (Holmes 1899:460-461).
. .,. . Haimes 'belreved thaC social" science "woUfd" hiHp'io" answer the "social
question." That is to say. in deciding a case, social science will simplify the
judge's selection by showing him or her which of the competing public policies
is more instrumental to a specific society and more responsive to the actual
feelings and demands of a particular time. ". have in mind an ultimate dependence
upon [social] science," Holmes states. "because it is finally for [social] science
to detennine ••. the relative worth of our different social ends [and desires]"
(1899:462).
Sociology's influence is evident in Holmes' argument for the development
of an empirical legal science capable of weighing social goals. To this end
Holmes proposed that "[f]or the rational study of the law the black-letter man
may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics
and the master of economics" (1897:469). Holmes could just as easily have
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in~luded the "master of sociology" to his I!st. but it was up to his intellectual
heIr. Roscoe Pound, to consider more fully sociology's role in American legal
thought: Nevert~cles~, we .must agree with Laski when he states that "[i]t is
almost mherenl m [hIS] philosophy that Mr. Justice Holmes should have bee
the forerunner of the sociological interpretation of law" ( 1931 :687). n
Sociological Jurisprudence
Typically sluggish in kee~ing up with the changing times, the American
le~al system ent~red. th~ twentieth century in its traditional nineteenth century
gUIse. as fo~maltst ~urJs~rudence. Formalist jurisprudence, being politically
cong~ent WIth.the Itberaltsm o~ the. post-<?ivil War period, had previously kept
le~~1 mterve~tlo~ and regulation ID SOCIal and economic matters to a bare
mlm~um. !hIS laIssez-faire I'«?li~y did not signi~y.the complete absence of legal
oV~~lgh~, It merely meant shifting the responSibility of control from artificial
entllies like th~ polity to "natural" ones like the marketplace. The self-regulating
market was saId to be guided by universal principles.
. The notion of universal or first principles - that is, unchanging rules. fixed
a~lo.m~, eternal. truths, predetennined conceptions - also affected the academic
dl~clphnes.of bIOlogy. political science. economics. and sociology. Indeed, there
eXI~ted an mtense preoccupation with the idea that general absolutes governed the
SOCial and natural worlds; thus it was only a matter of time before American
legal doctrine ~as likewise attracted to the universal principle.
Not. long l~tO the new century the natural and social sciences -- biology,
economIcs. SOCIology -- took a sharp methodological turn and abandoned the
altemp~ to dedu~e knowledge from predetennined conceptions. In contrast, legal
fonnah~m tenacl~usl.y held on to the traditional notion of authoritative precepts
and uDlversal prmclples. Noting the law's inability to keep up with social
progress, Roscoe Pound complained that "law has always been dominated by
Ideas.of the past long after they have ceased to be vital in other departments of
le~rnlDg" (1910:25). Accordingly, legal doctrine ran into the problem of not
bemg able to adapt to the changing conditions of the time. Or as Pound saw it
there existed a discrepancy<retwe'en'the"law ffi' books" and th~ "'Iaw'iri aclfon'J.' .
The traditional legal doctrine revealed its inadequacy by failing to meet the soci~
ends about which Holmes had previously been concerned.
. Pound d.ropped the sociological jurisprudential bombshell in an address
which he dehvered before the American Bar Association in S1. Paul. Minnesota
on A~gust 29. 1906. He stated resolutely that "our present system of COUrts is
I are~alc and our procedure behind the times" (1937:180). Pound's speech was aclanon call for .the.ref~~ a~~ modernization of what he saw as an antiquated! syste~ of legal JustIce. Law, he remarked in characteristically bold fashion, "is
I often tn. very truth a government of the living by the dead."4: .~IS speech was pivotal in American legal history because it marked the..... be~I~D1ng of a new movement in law that shook. challenged, and disturbed the
r eXlstmg system of legal orthodoxy. As John Wigmore so eloquently put it,
28 29
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Pound's St. Paul speech was "the spark that kindled the white flame of (legal)
progress" (1937: 176).
For Pound, the overly scientific bent of analytical jurisprudence had turned
the administration of justice into an abstract and artificial enterprise. Moreover.
he noted that "there is a special tendency in the lawyer to regard artificiality in
law as an end. to hold science something to be pursued for its own sake. to
forget in this pursuit the purpose of law" (Pound 1908:607-608). In addition. the
rigid exposition of hard and fast rules in analytical jurisprudence pre~ented the
law from adjusting itself to the mutable conditions of a protean society. As a
result. the law had ceased having a utilitarian function in dealing with the
realities of everyday life. It had turned into a hopelessly self-sustaining entity
completely out of touch with the human factor and social needs. .
Analytical jurisprudence. with its a priori concepts and deductive calCUlus.
had become a mechanical jurisprudence. Pound urged jurists to disavow the
technical operations of mechanical legal doctrine. or what he sometim~ r~ferred
to as "the jurisprudence of conceptions." and embrace a more realistic and
action~riented "jurisprudence ofends" (l908:61~11).
The central question to be considered. according to Pound (1908). must be
"how will a rule or decision operate in practice?" His objective in asking it was
to "attain a pragmatic, a sociological legal science," one that would "make rules
fit cases instead of making cases fit rules."
In 1907 in his address to the Section on Legal Education of the American
Bar Associ~tion. Pound advanced the idea that the conceptual, artificial, and
technical nature of mechanical jurisprudence had created a discrepancy between
the written law and the more substantive sentiments of the American people.
That is to say. that the law's rigidity prevented it from considering the practical
needs. wants, opinions, and interests of the individuals the law had been
mandated to serve. Pound stated that "legallheory and doctrine reached a degree of
fixity before the conditions with which law must deal tD-day had come into
existence" (1907:608). However. he noted optimistically. that "with the rise and
growth of political. economic. and sociological science. the time is ripe for a
new tendency;" a tendency that would consider the relations of law to socicty. a
. Jendency.lhat.PQund labeled sociological jurisprudence. ' : . . '. - .
The new approach that Pound was proposing .was an applied sCI~nce I~ !he
tradition of positivist sociology. He underscored hiS preference for thiS tradition.
and subsequently alluded to sociology's influence on him when he wrotc: "In
common with most Americans who had a scientific training in the 80's of the
last century. I was brought up on Comtian positivism and turned thencc to
Comtian sociology at the beginning of the present century" (Pound 195 I:17).
Sociological Jurisprudence and Sociology
"In the past fifty years the development of j~risprudencehas ~en affected
profoundly by sociology." wrote Roscoe Pound m 1927. In truth. It was Pound
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himself who. more than any other American legal thinker before him. brought
sociology fully into the realm of law.
To a greater degree than Holmes ever did. ~ound. throughou~ his a~ade~ic
life. purposefully forged intellectual ties and cultIvated personal friendships With
numerous sociologists.5 He was a very active member of the American
Sociological Society (having joined sometime between 1906 ,and 1910) and
puhlished several articles in The American Journal of SOCIOlogy In the
mid-1930s. Pound became interested in the sociologies of raw as promulgated by
his Harvard colleagues. Georges Gurvitch and Nicholas S. Timasheff. During the
I940s, and shortly after the departure of these two scholars from Harvard. Pound
taught graduate and undergraduate courses in the sociology of law in the
Department of Social Relations. at that instituti.on, ~~ ~Iso serv~d on doctoral
examination committees in SOCIology along with PJlJrlm Sorokm and Talcott
Parsons. Finally, never relying only on contemporary sociological themes,
Pound frequently cited the classic works of Comte. Durkheim, Marx, Tarde,
Spencer. and Weber. The cumulative effect of these efforts ~~ that Pound's
sociological jurisprudence "significantly promoted the recogmtlon of law as a
social phenomcnon" (Hunt 1978: 19). • . ..
All thesc innuences aside. Geis (1964). maintains that the SOCiologIcal
components of Pound's philosophy of law (and, as previously indica!~d, to a
lesser cxtcnt. that of Holmes also) were derived largely from the wnttngs of
Alhion Small. Lester Ward. and most especially, E.A. Ross who was .a
colleague of Pound's at the University of Nebraska during 1901-1906. In hiS
autohiography Ross wrote of Pound. "I did ~ot i'!iagine th.atl was ',!,aki~g a
denl' on him. but quietly he began to acquatnt hImself With the soclologlc~1
view of law and courts.... In 1906 he wrote to me. 'I believe you have set me In
the path the world is moving in'" (1936:89).
In 1901 Ross published Social Control, a book which qUi~kly became an
early American sociological classic. representing "an elaborate ,"ven~ory of ~e
methods by which a society induces conformity into human behaVIor" (Gels
1964:272). Here Ro5.'i contends that of all the manifold options of social control
available -.puhlic opinion. betief. social suggestion. religion. and the like -- I~w
. reign1; supJ:em~ .a1; "the m9st spe!=.i.al!J.ed and highly finished engine of socUlI .
control employed by society" (1939:106).
Pound. following Ross' lead, focused on the "social character of law" and
looked at the law's input on society. Accordingly. Pound defined law as a
"highly specializcd form of social c~ntroJ~ ca~ed on in acc~~anc~ with a bodr.
I of authoritative precepts. applicd 10 a JUdlcl~1 an.d admlOlstrat!ve proce~s(1942:41). The upshot of all this. Hunt maintams. IS that the nollon of SOCIalcontrol provided Pound's jurisprudence with a sociological starting point
t (1978:20).
l
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The Theory of Social Interests
There is no exaggeration in saying, along with Hunt (J 978:22), that
Pound's theory of interests lies at the conceptual core of sociological
jurisprudence. Further, it is in all likelihood the only truly sociological theory
ever fonnulated by Pound.
He first presented the theory of interests in the keynote address which he
delivered before the American Sociological Society in 1921. Allhough Pound. in
his various writings, continued to revise and elaborate on the theory, he,
nevertheless, consistemly promulgated three types of interests: the individual
the public and the social. I will not here consider individual interests becaus~
they are largely tangential to a sociological analysis of Pound's jurisprudence.
Further. because "[mlost commentators agree that the category of public interests
need not be advanced as a separate type and is besllreated as a sub-type of social
interests" (Hunt 1978:24). I will focus only on what Pound had to say about the
latter.
Because Pound's notion of social interests evolved through many years, I
have developed a composite description and define social interests very generally
as the prevalent claims, demands, desires, or expectations which human beings
collectively seek to satisfy and which society must recognize and protect through
the law. Because the law protects them. they are given the status of legal rights.
To put it slightly differently, a right is a legally protected social interest.
Pound regards social interests as empirical entities because they are to be
found only in society; more to the point, they are to be found in the law and
legal processes of society. Social interests, then. are not abstract presuppositions
derived from such detenninist sources as theological doctrine. the philosophical
ideas about human nature, or the social psychological classit1cation of instincts.
Instead. Pound inveighed, the social interests can be inferred "by a less
pretentious method" (1943: 16) - that is. through the empirical investigation of
objective data. The objective data on which he relied included coun decisions.
law reports, legislative declarations, committee reports. debates, and what is
~~llen i~ a ~ide. array of works referring to the law. liThe first step in such an
.. mvesligat'iof1," 'writes Pouba:'''is'"'a mere" survey ''Of 'the legal order and an
inventory of the social interests which have pressed upon lawmakers and judges
and jurists for recognition"(I943: 17). Through a painstaking and thorough
analysis of hundreds of legal documents. Pound inventories the social interests
which have been asserted in "civilized society" (i.e.• in general, European
countries and in particular England and the United States) and which must he
I~gally recognized and secured in order to maintain that society. He then proposes
~IX broad categories of social interests and their subcategories. The six general
mterests are as follows:
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I. TIle soc!al ~nterest i.n the general security.
2. The SOCial mterest In the security of social institutions,
3. The social inlerest in the general morals.
4. The social interest in the conservation of social resources.
5. The social interest in general progress.
6. The social interest in the individual life.
. T~rough his p~ogram or sociological jurisprudence, Pound succeeded in
dlrectmg the allentlon ~f the legal establishment of his lime to the practical
concerns of!he .study 01 law.and to the law's relationship with society. Pound
C(~nSlant~y highlighted the SOCial character of law and for this he deserves, along
wlt~ Ol~ver Wendell Holmes, to he recognized as a leading I1gure of the
soclologl~a~ movement in law. All this notwithstanding. however, it was only a
n~aller of tIme before Pound's legal philosophy was replaced by another. As
~I«:rre Lepaulle. put it so prophetically as early as 1922: "Sociological
Junsprudence, hk~ all human creations, is not a pennanent thing: it may
represent the best lorees of the present generation; it will certainly dissatisfy the
next" (1922:H50).
Legal Realism
~~erican lega! Realis~ .was a pragmatic philosophy of law that, fueled by
skeptlcls~, was hlg~ly cntlcal of the contention that legal formalism was
c.haractenzed by certalOtr, predict~biJity, and unilonnity. Legal Realism emerged
(10 !he late 1920s) dunng a period of profound social change in American
society. The second decade of the twentieth century was a time ripe for the rise of
such a movement in law. It was a time when the values and ideals of the
Progressive era, its optimism and cheerfulness, had been utterly destroyed by the
global upheaval created by World War I. The result, Savarese states, was "the
dcc.ay of confidence in progress and the growth of a climate of suspicion from
which the world has never quite recovered" (1965: 181). "Earnestness. a favorite
stat~ orlhe prewar years," writes Edward G. White, "was replaced by cynicism;
socml responsibility gave ,way to alienation. virtuousness .appeared as.hypocrisy"
(1972: 1014).
Along with the First World War, two other events, the stock market crash
of 1.929 and th~ resulting Great Depression. also marked a repudiation of some
baSIC as~u.mptlons about American culture which had been fostered by
ProgressIvism. ConSe(IUcntly. a more skeplical, even cynical, set of ideas
rcpl.ac~d the optimism of the Progressive era: prosperity was not permanent;
capitalism, wh~ther regulated or nOI, was not omnipotent; people were not
ca~abJe of mastering their economic environment; the future is not necessarily
a~n ImprovemC.llt upon the past. And so, "one by one the truths of early twentieth
century Amenca were exposed as myths. The gap between illusion and reality
seemed ever-widening" (White 1972: 1017).
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Despite the skepticism brought on by the social events mentioned above,
there nevertheless endured an optimistic belief --a kind of unwavering faith -- in
science. Throughout most of the nineteenth century, academic interest had
focused principally on the impressive achievements of the natural and the
physical sciences and on their methods of research. But by the end of World War
I the term "science" increasingly included the behavioral and social sciences,
most notably psychology, cullural anthropology, and sociology. Infused by this
faith in science, it was only natural that the Realists would set out to discover
how it was that the empirical method of induction applied to the social sciences
in general and to the law in particular. Uilimately, the Realists' objective was
the development of an empirical science in law.
Of all the behavioral sciences, psychology, and in particular some of its
then novel variants, behaviorism,and Freudian psychoanalysis, most influenced
legal Realism. And of the social sciences it was sociology which proved an
inspiration to the Realists in their investigations of the law in action. However,
the greatest contribution to Realist jurisprudence was the fact that in the
intellectual community of the 1920s (especially in the humanities and social
sciences) there had been a reaction against abstractions and first principles and a
movement toward the idea of a changing and developing society. The upshot of
all this is that. at the time. there existed an intellectual trend rejecting
conceptualism but accepting of pragmatism (Kalman 1986: 15).
White posits that of all the Realists, the views of Karl Llewellyn and
Jerome Frank have received the most attention within the legal community. The
reason for this is "not because their views were most representative of the
movement .•• but because they were the most anxious of their peers to see
themselves as members of a jurisprudential 'school: to attempt to state its
canons. and to criticize other schools" (White 1972:1000-1001). Since Frank's
jurisprudence was largely influenced by psychoanalysis (see Frank 1930;
Glennon 1985), in the following section I will examine only Llewellyn's legal
philosophy and how it was affected by sociology.
Karl N. Llewellyn
.~ -
In 1911 Llewellyn enrolled at Yale and fell "under the spell" of William
Graham Sumner. Although he had died in 1910, Sumner had previously taught
at Yale and his ideas had been kept alive by his devoted disciple A. G. Keller. As
a consequence of having been influenced by Sumner, "before he reached law
school. Llewellyn came to the study of law with a predisposition to see law as a
social institution embedded in its surrounding culture" (Twining 1973:94).
White sees Llewellyn's "A Realistic Jurisprudence -- The Next Step," as
"the first self-conscious statement of Realism" (White 1972:1018). In this article
Llewellyn distinguishes between "paper" rules and "real" rules. Paper rules are,
very simply. "the accepted doctrine of the time and place -- what the books t~ere
say 'the law' is" (Llewellyn 1930:448). Real rules, by contrast, are convelUent
shorthand symbols for the concrete actions -- that is. the tangible practices or
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behavi~r~ -- of the courts, administrative agencies, and public officials.
Determmmg whether the courts abide by paper or real rules requires seeking "the
real practice on the subject, by study of how the cases do in fact eventuate"
(Llewellyn 1930:450). Taking a behaviorist, or what he calls a
"behavior-content" approach, to the study of real rules, Llewellyn proposes that
"the point of reference of all things legal" be consciously shifted away from the
conceptual rules, precepts, and principles of legal formalism and toward an
empirical study of the observable behavior of the courts and those affected by the
courts. Indeed. "(w]hat (L1ewllyn] insisted on as the next step in jurisprudence
was to apply the [conception of human behavior] systematically to legal
problems" (Yntema 1960:318).
By 1949, however, Llewellyn had gone beyond examining the law as mere
social behavior and instead highlighted the sociological concept of "institution"
in his analysis.
I should wish to gather in also not only active conduct but the relevant
attitudes and relevant Jines of inaction, and the interactions of any portion
of the institution with any other institution; and the machinery for
recruiting and for breaking in the institution's specialized personnel; and a
dozen or so obvious elements in any living major complex of the
"institution" sort. Indeed the first direct contribution of the "law"
discipline to sociology lies just here (Llewellyn 1949:453).
In his second major article. "Som~ Realism About Realism" (1931).
Llewellyn lists several basic tenets which characterize the movement and which
all its adherents essentially share. I will focus on only one of these tenets which
most directly addresses sociological concerns. "
According to Llewellyn. Realist jurisprudence accepts the idea that society
changes at a faster rate than does the law. As a result. the "law needs
re-examination to determine how far it fits the society it purports to serve." In
proposing this notion Llewellyn relies on the concept of cultural lag formulated
by William Ogburn in 1922. A closer examination ofcultural lag will reveal the
relationship bet~een law a.n~ sl?Ciety as Llewellyn sawit.. _ ",.
", Ogbuin( 1964)' maintains that due to the tremendous increase in
technological inventions there have been many frequent and rapid transformations
taking place in the cultural conditions of society. Further. because there is a
correlation and interdependence of the constituent parts in society. readjustment
becomes necessary when the various components of culture do not change
concomitantly. For example. an alteration in the material culture (this includes
houses, factories. machines. raw materials, manufactured products, and
foodstuffs) makes subsequent adjustments necessary through changes in the
adaptive non-material culture (this includes customs, beliefs, philosophies.
. governments, and laws). The modifications in the adaptive non-material culture,
. however, are frequently delayed and there is said to be a maladjustment during
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officials and members of the Committee to Re-elect the President were found
guilty?f numero~s crimes, including burglary, illegal wiretapping. violations of
camp~lgn fin~nctng laws, sabotage, and the attempted misuse of governmental
agencies •• VIZ., the Federal Bureau of Investigation. the Internal Revenue
Service, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The affair also involved the
attempt by the White House to conceal and deny many of those illegal actions.
The ~atcrg~te scandal ultimately led to the conviction on criminal charges
of top Nixon aides, among them U.S. Attorney General John N. Mitchell,
Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs John Ehrlichman and White
House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman. All three were convicted of'conspiracy,
obstructing justice, and perjury. Former counsel to the President, John Dean
became the main witness against Nixon at the hearings of the Seneate Select
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities. Dean implicated a number of
high-level Nixon administration officials, including Mitchell, who had approved
the break-in at the Watergate building. Dean also stated that Nixon had previous
knowledge of these activities. Facing certain impeachment by Congress. Nixon
resigned the Office of the President of the United States on August 9, 1974.
Deeply troubled by the falsehoods, deceptions. fabrications, and
contradictions of the Watergate scandal, t~e American people had. by the mid
1970s. experienced an unprecedented "crisis in confidence" in their governmental
and legal institutions. Watergate had revealed that these institutions were not the
stalwan and trustworthy entities many Americans had long considered them to
be. .
Sociologist Jeffrey Alexander states that tithe Watergate crisis demonstrated
America's capacity for self-criticism" (Ritzer 1992:464). In academe, this crisis
manifested itself as in intense cynicism and criticism of the existing social and
r political structures. In law schools such as Yale and Harvard the crisis took the
I' form of a critique of the received legal doctrine by the movement in law called".. Critical Legal Studies. In an attempt to defend legal Iiberalism6 from thel~ onslaughts of CLS, the traditionalists in those laws schools soon accused the
While no single social development can be credited with having led to the Critics of being nihilistic, Marxist, and utopian. To be sure, the controversy
creation of a legal movement, in general, one event can. ta~it1y and overtly. have between the proponents and opponents of CLS is certain to continue for some
'an impact on· the formation ·of-such. a movem~Jlt. One SOCIal event t~at, at least time to-come. ~.' : 7" • '. - •• J ••• -" '.g.: ..... --•• - ... .
circuitously, contributed to the flourishing of one of the more recent mtellectual According to Debra Livingston, Critical Legal Studies "does not have a
ttends in legal scholarship, Critical Legal Studies (CLS), was the Watergate definitive methodological approach tl (1982: 1669). We take Ihis to mean that
affair of the early 1970s. . ' there is no one distinctive way of doing critical legal scholarship. Nonetheless,
Clearly the biggest political scandal in U.S. history, the. Water~ale affair Livingston explains. CLS does have 'trecourse to the methodologies of olher
consisted of various illegal activities designed to help PreSident Richard .M.' disciplinestl (1982:1680-1681). She jdentifi~es three methodologies which CLS
Nixon win reelection in 1972. Two years later it resulted in Nixon's resignallon borrows from various fields -- of which foremost among them is sociology.·
of the presidency after he became implicated in an attempt to cover up the ., and utilizes to critique legal liberalism: (1) social theory, (2) pure critique. and
scandal. . ', (3) textual explication.
As a specific event "Watergate" referred to the break.l~ and ele~tr~OIc,{
bugging of the Democratic National Committee headquarters With th~ obJectlv~~. r./
by the Nixon While House. to discredit Democratic candidat~ and dl~"!pt .~elr ':. t.
Party"s 1972 presidential nomination. In lime, about forty NIXon admlnlstrat1on:~ ..,,;~ ~r
<'~'~'~~~'.:~:<:~'~ 1f·
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that period of time: a period which could last many years. This is the hypothesis
of cultural lag, and Ogburn provide~ an ilIu~~ation. . .
Because of the changing material condlllons of mdustry ··that IS, as a result
of numerous workers using machines dangerous to life and limb -- there were.
between 1850 and 1870. a great many a~c~d~nts occ~rring in the workplace.
During that period of time the cost of the mJunes sustatne~ b~. the worke~ was
borne by the workers themselves. Although employer hablhty laws eXisted,
under these laws the worker, in order to recover, had to sue the employer unless,
as in some cases, settlement was made outside the courts. In either eyent, the
legal expenses were high and the entire process ~as p~tentl~ unfal~ to ~he
worker. The employer liability laws were inadequate 10 dc:ah~g With the Situallon
caused by the accide.nts arising from the ~evelop~ent.an lD~ustry. A cUltu~al
maladjustment existed between the aC~lde.nt Situation (I.e., the ~ateflal
conditions of the complexity of machane mdustry) and the law (I.e.• the
non-material culture).
It was nol until 1915 that all of the highly industrialized states (except
Pennsylvania and Delaware) enacted workmen's compe.nsation laws which ma~e
remuneration to the injured worker almost ~utomatlc. In. sum, the m~tenal
culture changed in the period 185~1870 whale the adapuve ~uhure did not
change until about 1915. During thiS time there w~ a maladJust~ent to the
accident situation; that is to say. a less satisfactory adjustment than ID the years
which preceded and in the yeatS which followed.
This idea of cultural lag and the Jaw, combined with the rest of Llewllynls
propositions characterizing the Realist movement, can be s~ted in ~ap~ule fonn
as follows: lithe program implicit in legal realism was detailed, objective st~dy
of law as an instrument to achieve desired ends and in the context of a changmg
society" (Yntema 1960:320). '
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The 'Imethodology" of social theory comes directly from sociology. The
various sociological paradigms - in panicular Marxist theory, connictlheory,
criticallheory, Weberian theory, and even funclionalism - serve as useful guides
for re.;onstituting society, human associations. and legal doctrine. Although
social theory may produce an alternate vision of society which some would
describe as impractical and inviable, it nevertheless provides CLS with a
blueprint for changing what the Critics see as the tyrannical institutions
currendy in existence in capitalist society. Roberto Unger (1983), for example,
makes use of social theory in proposing a ttcounterprogram" to social, political,
economic, and legal liberalism.
In the first (and only) footnote to his pioneering article. "The Critical Legal
Studies Movement. It Unger presents two main tendencies of the CLS
Movement. The first tendency sees legal onhodoxy as advancing one particular
view of society and human associations. It also portrays liberal legal doctrine as
indetenninate. The second tendency. grounded in the social thought of Marx and
Weber and in the historical and social analysis of functionalist and critical
theory. sees tbe law and liberal legal doctrine as reflecting, confirming, and
reshaping "the social divisions and hierarchies" of capitalist society. In
conslrUcting his counterprogram to legal liberalism, Unger builds on these two
main tendencies of the Movemenl
The direct influence of German sociological theory is apparent throughout
Unger's counterprogram. Indeed, Collins (1987:387) maintains that Unger's
approach to legal studies leans mostly on the tradition of social theory marked
out by Hegel, Marx, and Weber. Unger, for instance. is well aware of the
time-honored sociological notion that. on the one hand, institutional structures
mold and constrain individual's passions and personality, but on the other hand.
"a vision of Iransformed personal relations may serve in tum to inspire major
institutional change" (Unger 1983:586). With this dialectical connection in
mind, Unger introduces his program of institulional reconstruction, which has as
its main goal lithe systemalic remaking of all direct personal connections -- like
, those.between superiors and subordinates or between'men and women -- through' -,
their progressive emancipation from a background plan of social division and
hierarchy" (1983:587). Unger's method of internal development. or the process
whereby one imaginatively or practically pushes the abstract ideals (e.g.• the
market) of liberal legal doctrine -- and their institutional realizations (e.g.,
conlract and propeny ) -- to their utmost impJicalion, serves as a heuristic device
in the reconstitution of social institutional arrangements, in particular the
organization of government. the organization of the economy, and the system of
rights.
While Unger undoubtedly relies on some aspects of Marxist theory, his
counterprogram appears rather tame relative to orthodox Marxist revolutionary
practice. For instance, according to Unger, the route to lake in transforming
society must be a balanced, middle path between "conservative refonn," which
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~eeks to change ,the"pattern of personal relations between indiViduals, and
textbook re.voluuon, Ihe goal of which is praxis or the complete restructuring
of the established large-scale social institutions. In order 10 acl transfonnatively
Unger's. counlerpr~gram (which he also refers to as "superJiberalism") must
engage.1D a revol~lJonary reform which ·'alters (personal) relations
t
collectively
?nd.del._berate'y. In ways that prefigure or encourage some partial change of the
institutional o~der" (Ung~r 1983:672). It appears that Unger has at least in pan
const~cted hiS t~eorellcal scheme in reaction to "vanguard" (Bolsehvik)M~r;llls?,. Hence, It see~~ qUil~ .likely that Unger's legal theory acts as an
antltheuea' response or cnhcal rCJolDder to lraditional Marxist social thought.
Pure Critique
The meth~~ology of pure critique is also an important part of the CLS
ar~nal. Pure.cntlque has several intellectual sources but it is best depicted by the
cntlcal ~heonsts of the Frankfurt School - Herbert Marcuse. Erich Fromm, Max
Horkhelmer. Franz Neumann, Theodor Adorno. Leo Lowenthal, and more
re~ently, Jurgen Habermas. Duncan Kennedy's article "Form and Substance in
Pnvate. Law Adjudication" (1976) serves as an example of the use of critical
theory I~ CLS. To be sure. Kennedy is one of those rare scholars who candidly
and publicly a~~nowledg~ the influence that past thinkers have had on his work.
Among the cntlcal theonsts that Kennedy credits are Marx, Karl Mannheim,
Georg LUka~~, and Marcuse (See Kennedy 1976:1712; 1980:24).
~e c~ltlca! social theory of the Frankfurt School has its roots in the~ega!lve dialectics or ~e~el. Marcuse describes Hegel's negalive dialectics as
motlvate~ .by ~he convlcllon that the given (acls Ihat appear 10 common sense
as the positive.mdex of tru~h are in realhy the negation or lruth. so that trulh can
only ~ estabhshed by their destruction" (1960:26-27). Thus. we arrive at lnJe
meanJDg when we deny. through contradiction, Ihal which is presented as truth
For. ex~u.-ple. one o~ the dominant values upheld by legal liberalism is the valu~
or l~dlvlduaJ. self-mterest: people should be allowed to pursue their ownhapP!ne~s .their own way. On the olher hand, there also exists the cultural .Yalue
-thai mdJYJ.duals should consider the well-being of others. Pilling these two
v?lues agamst each other results in a contradiction. bUI il is a conlradiclion that
glv~s ~s a.beller understanding of legal liberalism and the social context in
whIch I! eXists. !,cnn~y refers to this process as "Ihe method of contradictions. IIAcco~dJng to him thiS method is based on two premises. The first is IIthat the
experience. of unresolvable conflict among our own values and ways of
un~erstan~JO~ t~e world ar~ hcr~ to stay." This is another way of saying that
SOCial rea~lty IS mh~rently dlalechcal. The second premise is "lhatthere is order
and mca?mg to. be dl~overcd even within the sense ofcontradiclion...
In hiS se~mal article Kennedy discusses .he characteristics and qualities of
what he consl~ers to be. the tw~ a~ti.lhetical "rhelorical modes" which impinge
" upon substanllve le~al I~sues: mdlvldualism and altruism. He also posits two
.:' opposed modes whIch Influence lithe fonn in which legal Solulions to the
t:'.~
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substantive problems should be cast": rules and standards. The relationship
between the dual sets of rhetorical modes becomes salient in private law disputes
because altruism favors standards while individualism jibes with the use of rules.
Like all ideologies, different utopian visions of what is right and good undergird
both sets of discursive genres. Kennedy's objective in employing the method of
contradictions is to trace historically the conflict between the two sets of
rhetorical modes' by illustrating how individualism and altruism, which operate
at the substantive level of law, are infonned by rules and standards, which
operate at the formal level of law.
Kennedy shows that the relationship between form and substance is based on
several moral, economic, and political arguments which have, at least since the
Civil War, influenced considerably the semantics of legal discourse and the
direction of legal consciousness. One of the economic argumeOls is premised on
the doctrine of social Darwinism.
The commentary runs as follows. At the substantive level, individualism
presses the point that those persons with economic power (and who have thus
proved themselves more fit to survive in the competitive marketplace) should be
free from legal intervention. Only they have the knowledge and competence to
use resources wisely and make financial investments. These investments are
commercial transactions, the argument continues, which ultimately benefit
society and regulating them only inhibits economic growth and production.
Al the level of fonn, the rationale for using rules is also predicated on the
ideology of social Darwinism. Unlike standards, which require the judge to
discover the social values inherent in a specific legal situation, rules, because of
their high degree of generality, are more arbitrary and difficult to apply ~o the
particulars of a case. This whimsical feature of rules makes the economically
powerful less fearful that legal intrusion will disrupt their commercial
uansactions. In other words, rules minimize the degree ofjudicial interference on
the aggressive activities ofself-interested parties. .
In articulating these arguments Kennedy evinces that the social theory of
Herbert Spencer had an extraordinary alignment with the political, economic. and
legal thought extant throughout most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
.. ~••J~ •• "~~.'
Textual Explication
Finally, the third methodology mentioned by Livingston, the explication of
legal "texts" or written works, has to do with the process of interpreting legal
rules, principles, concepts, cases, and doctrine. The hermeneutical t~chniq~cs
employed by the Critics are borrowed from several sources IOc.lud.mg
deconstructionism. A recent trend in literary criticism, deconstructlomsm
involves the strategy of closely reading a text for the purpose of penetrating the
surface and getting at its hidden meaning and unexpressed assumptions.7 The
texl, which the Critics consider intrinsicly unstable to being with, is taken apan
_ deconstructed - and its structure and logic are questioned. In the CLS progrom,
the end result of textual explication is that the underlying inconsistencies and
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contradictions of liberal legal doctrine are uncovered. Clare Dahon's (1985)
attempt to deconstruct contract doctrine shows how this is accomplished.
~ahon uses deconstruclionism (or the poststructuralist approach of Jacques
Dernda) to argue that contract doctrine is inherently indeterminate. She is
primarily concerned with t~e tensions between concepts as they appear in the
language of contract doctrme. These conceptual tensions Dalton describes as
··dangerous supplements," a concept borrowed from Derrida (1976). This means
that ~hen t~rms unite with, or are added to each other -- the private and the
publiC, for IDstance -- they define themselves in opposition, contrast, and
!Cference to ~ch other. Put anot~er way, ··the use of these terms always seems to
Imply the. eXIstence of the other' (Frug 1984:12). Derrida (1973) would say that
the meanmg of these terms is based on their difference. In effect, no linguistic
construct can be reduced to an ultimate definition. Contral}' to the assenions of
received contract doctrine, Dalton argues that there is no consensus as to the
literal meaning of the terminology used in legal discourse. Further. dualities of
connicling leg~1 principles are not equal. One category is usually preferred and
thu~ ~nked higher than the other. Liberal legal doctrine, for instance, has
tradJllonally favored the private aspect ofcontract over the public aspect.
C?areful sc~tiny of the three major methodologies employed by the CLS
theOrists -- SOCIal theol}', pure critique, and textual explication - reveals that
they. have. introduced soc~ology into their legal philosophy. Critical Legal
StudlC:S will no doubt contmue to look to sociological concepts, theories, and
paradigms for help in formulating its critical program against the principles of
legal liberalism.
Conclusion
Sociology. to be sure, has made several significant contributions to modem
juristic thought First, it has contributed to the language of the law some of its
richest and most descriptive concepts: social evolution, social conflict~ns!itution. social cont~ol. ~ult.ural lag, and the like. Second, it has give~
JUrisprudence penetrating IOslght into the social dynamics of the law.
·~c~o~ingly. the law is·now~seen··ana·ireatea·as· a saclafPhenomenon: an
IDstltutlon. a system, and a component of society. Third, sociology has disclosed
and underscored the interdependence extant between law and the other social
insti~utions, in particular the economy and the polity. Fourth, sociology has
proVIded jurisprudence with a positivistic, structural methodology by which to
study th~ law. Finally, sociology has most recently inspired an approach that is
,_ perspectival and henneneutical in orientation. In shon, then, it has attempted to
;- demystify and relalivizc jurisprudence.
f This.paper has shown that some of the principles of sociology have had a
marked mfluence on four of the main jurisprudential movements of the
twen.tieth~entury: Holmesian legal science, sociological jurisprudence, legal
" Realism, and Critical Legal Studies. It is of the utmost import, then. that
present and future students of the law be cognizant of the contributions that
40
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sociology in general, and its subdiscipline the sociology of law, have made to
legal theory. Whether it is recognized or not, sociology will continue to make
theoretical contributions to jurisprudence. It remains to be seen, however, if
other sociological paradigms·· social exchange theory, symbolic interactionism,
ethnomethodology, and phenomenological sociology, for instance -- also leave
their imprint on legal theory. At bottom however, only a candid
acknowledgment and affmnation of the confluence ofsociology and jurisprudence
will foster a fruitful collaboration between the two disciplines as well as vivify
an enlightened intellectual dialogue of great worth to both of them.8
1
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8. An ana~ysis of the other side of the sociology-jurisprudence relationship
.- Ihal IS, how Ihe laller discipline has influenced the formcr onc -- is
hest left for anolher papcr. In lighl of Ihc faci Ihal jurisprudence has
now dcvelopcd a social theory thai it can claim as ils own. such an
an41lysis would be a trcmendous asset 10 sociology.
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METHOD AS RUSE: FOUCAULT AND RESEARCH METHOD
Marvin L. Cooke
Tulsa Junior College
Mid-American Review ofSociology, 1994. Vol XVIII. No. 1&2: 47~S
A ruse is a gimmick or device used as a strategy or instrument. For
Foucault, method can best be understood as a ruse rather than as a method
which promises truth. Methods regulate what can be discovered and the
discourse about what can be discovered In this essay. the realist and idealist
models of method are criticized from Foucault's perspective. Both models
rely on some transcendental reality which -. from Foucault's perspective--
are constructed by the practices ofresearch itself. Even though Foucault
rejects foundational assumptions, he does have a method which has its
homogeneity, its systematicity, and its generality. Foucault's method is
outlined, discussed, and related to similar methods. Finally, Foucault's
critics are notedand answered
Method in most social science is built on either the realist or the idealist
model of epistemology (Smith 1983; Smith and Heshusius 1986). The realist
model assumes a social reality independent of the knower that can be know if
only the knower can be divested of values. that is. if the knower can be
objective. Thus, the realist utilizes randomization. blind tests. the null
hypothesis. the separation of the researcher from the subject. and numerous other
devices practically to force a separation of fact and value in the practice of
knowing. Claims about social reality which do not utilize such practices are
criticized as being conditioned or biased by the values. emotions, or interests of
the knower.
The idealist model assumes that knowing cannot be separated from the
knowing subject. Regardless of practices used to separate the knower from
..so~r~es of .bias, the knower always actively selects theories. methOds.- and
interpretations. Thus, fact can never be separated from value. For the idealist.
one uses one's own capacity for understanding to anempt to understand the
meaning that others give to situations. Since the subject in the only one who
can confirm or modify a researcher's understanding of the subject. the
independence of the subject and the knower from coercion is fundamental to the
process of intersubjective Understanding.
Both the rcaslist and the idealist models represent a solution to Kant's
question, "What is enlightenment?" (Kant 1963). As Gutting (1989) notes:
His ramous answer was that enlightenment is man's release from his
"inability to make use or his understanding without direction rrom another:
an inability that was to be overcome by finding the courage to use onc's
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